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THE DISCOVERY RULE: ALLOWING ADULT
SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR REDRESS
INTRODUCTION
She was sexually abused almost daily from the age of four
to twenty-four by her next-door neighbor, the father of her best
friend.' He told her repeatedly that the sexual abuse was "for
her benefit and that she should not tell anyone else because it
was their secret.' Her childhood was consumed by psychologi-
cal debilitations, such as eating disorders, outbursts of rage,
substance and alcohol abuse, and thoughts of suicide3. She
1 See Plaintiffs Affidavit, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 154 lbliz. 2d 46, 584
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992) (No. 91-23118), for a detailed account
of the sexual abuse the victim had endured.
Once when I was playing in the .. . yard, I fell on the sprinder head
and cut a gash on my knee. [The abuser] took me upstairs to his
daughter's bedroom. I felt faint. He put his hand into my shirt and then
inside my underpants. After a while, he took me to the hospital, where I
had to get seven stitches. ... I also remember recurring forms of abuse.
For example, defendant used to swim up under me in his pool and put
his finger inside my bathing suit and into my vagina. Sometimes, he put
his hand inside my shirt and squeezed my nipples so hard that it hurt.
Instances like this occurred almost daily.
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 3.
' Anonymous v. Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d 46, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1992); see Affidavit of Dr. Grassian at 5, Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 154 MAisc. 2d 46, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992) (No. 91-
23118) ("there was a two-fold effect of the duress: during her childhood, the duress
directly prevented her from speaking out, and the duress contributed to her lack
of any comprehensible memory of the abuse, and thus continued to prevent her
from speaking out."). A child who is sexually abused at a young age often is un-
able to put an end to the abuse simply because the child becomes an adult.
"Tere is no magic age when [a victim of childhood sexual abuse] suddenly be-
comes responsible for [the victim's] own abuse." ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, BE-
GINNING To HEAL 38 (1993). Although an adult, a victim still responds like the
"small, powerless child" who was subjected to the sex-ual abuse initially. Id. For
additional discussion on why adult survivors of childhood rsxual abuse cannot
terminate the abuse after becoming an adult, see infra note 135 and accompanying
text.
I BASS & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 3; Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d at 49, 584
N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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blamed herself for the abuse and was unable to form friend-
ships or trust others. She "feared physical contact; found it
terrifying to be with other people, and feared intimacy and
sexual contact. " She often suffered from black-outs, night-
mares and flashbacks and for many years repressed the memo-
ries of the abuse. Because she could not recall the acts of sexu-
al abuse, she was unable to understand the source of her psy-
chological traumas.5
Finally, during therapy at the age of twenty-eight, she
realized the reason for her suffering and brought an action for
personal injuries against the abuser.6 The Suffolk County Su-
preme Court held, however, that the statute of limitations
barred her from bringing a civil claim against him.7 As in pre-
vious sexual abuse cases brought by adult survivors, New York
law enabled the abuser to use the statute of limitations as a
shield from liability for sexually abusing children. New York is
one of the minority of states that has yet to recognize the ineq-
uities resulting from a strict application of the statute of limi-
tations in cases of childhood sexual abuse.8
Childhood sexual abuse claims instituted by adult survi-
vors introduce a formidable challenge to the legal system.
Traditionally, the time within which an action must be com-
menced is computed from the time the cause of action ac-
crued-the date of the injury-or, in cases of childhood sexual
abuse, the date of the abuse.9 Many children subjected to re-
'Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d at 49, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
Id. at 50, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
Id. at 47, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
7 Id. at 50, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 718. The court held that unless the victim could
show that she was insane under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 208 (McKinney 1990), or
could show that equitable estoppel barred the defendant from asserting the de-
fense of the statute of limitations, pursuant to N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-
103(4)(b) (McKinney 1989), the victim could not institute a civil action against her
abuser because the statute of limitations had run. Anonymous, 154 Misc.2d at 56,
584 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The court ordered a fact-finding hearing on those issues, but
the parties settled before the hearing took place. Telephone Interview with Ellen
Gesmer, Attorney for Plaintiff (Oct. 19, 1994).
' See infra note 87 for a survey of states that, unlike New York, toll the stat-
ute of limitations for adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse until the victim
has discovered either that the abuse occurred or that the injuries were caused by
the abuse. For purposes of this Note, the phrase "childhood sexual abuse" moans
any nonconsensual and unwanted sexual contact between an adult and a minor
child. A minor child is any person under the age of 18.
' See, e.g., N.Y. CiM. PRAC. L. & R. 203(a) ("The time within which an action
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peated acts of sexual abuse suffer physically, psychologically
and emotionally, often repressing the episodes of sexual abuse
in order to avoid dealing with the pain and trauma caused by
the abuse.10 The statutory bar precludes many adult survivors
of childhood sexual abuse from instituting civil suits simply be-
cause they have not yet "discovered" either that the sexual
abuse occurred or that the sexual abuse was the cause of their
psychological turmoil."
The traditional purposes upon which statutes of limita-
tions are based cannot justify their use in the context of child-
hood sexual abuse. Statutes of limitations are imbedded in the
judicial system, yet their specific goals are not easily discern-
ible. "[C]ourt opinions offer meritorious but broad generaliza-
tions that have been carried forward from nineteenth century
decisions and have provided little guidance" in determining the
purposes of limitations periods. 2
Accepted policy reasons for the statutory time periods are
the dual goals of preserving evidence for trial and preventing
stale claims.13 Because the typical tort victim is aware of his
injury and its cause upon its happening, he is expected to
promptly bring suit. This expectation rests on the view that
defendants should be assured that after a given period they
will not be required to defend against old claims, whether
meritorious or not. The defendant is therefore relieved of the
burden of defending against stale claims in which vital evi-
dence may no longer be available. Although these justifications
may be sound in ordinary tort cases, they are unjust in child-
hood sexual abuse cases.
4
Recently, a number of jurisdictions enacted legislation that
must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed
from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the clam is interpozed.").
Civil actions to recover damages for personal injury must be commenced within
three years. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & B. 214(5).
10 For a discussion of the psychological impact of childhood sexual abuse, see
infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text for a dircussion of the nature
of the injuries that childhood sexual abuse causes.
12CALVIN W. CORIAN, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIoNS 5-6 (1991).
" See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEE'roN o; THE LAW OF
TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
1 See infra notes 173-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons
the traditional purposes of the statute of limitations are not applicable in the
context of childhood sexual abuse.
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permits the tolling of the civil statute of limitations until the
victim of childhood sexual abuse discovers or reasonably should
have discovered the cause of action. 5 These jurisdictions de-
veloped a "discovery rule" to allow a plaintiff to sue for latent
harm that she could not have discovered within the normal
statute of limitations." The Supreme Court first applied the
discovery rule to a tort cause of action in Urie v. Thompson,
17
where the Court held that a plaintiffs cause of action for negli-
gent exposure to silicosis disease accrued not at the time of
exposure, but when he realized he had contracted the dis-
ease."8 Since Urie, New York has extended the discovery rule
to various torts including fraud, 9 medical malpractice,20 in-
jury caused by the latent effects of exposure to any sub-
stance,2' for example, Agent Orange,2 and actions for breach
of warranty of agency.' These applications of the discovery
's See infra note 87.
" For a discussion of the development and application of the discovery rule,
see infra notes 82-138 and accompanying text.
17 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
'" Id. at 168-72. Under traditional statutes of limitation, this cause of action
would have accrued at the "time of the last exposure to the causative conditions"
and the plaintiffs claim would have been time-barred. Russell G. Donaldson, Anno-
tation, Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse
of Child, 9 A.LR.5th 321 (1993).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 213(8) ("an action based on fraud; the time within
which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plain-
tiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with rea-
sonable diligence have discovered it."); see also N.Y. CrV. PRAC. L. & R. 214(7)
(applying the discovery rule to marriage annulment actions based on fraud).
20 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214-a ("where the action [for medical, dental or
podiatric malpractice] is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body
of the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery . . . of facts' which would reasonably lead to such discovery").
21 N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 214-c(2) ("an action to recover damages for personal
injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any sub-
stance or combination of substances, in any form .... shall be computed from the
date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the
exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the
plaintiff').
22 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-b ("an action to recover damages for personal
injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving as
a member of the armed forces . . . may be commenced within two years of the
date of the discovery of such injury, or within two years from the date when
through the exercise of reasonable diligence the cause of such injury should have
been discovered").
13 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 206(b) ("Where an injury results from the repre-
sentation by a person that he is an agent with authority to execute a contract in
(Vol. 61: 199
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rule prevent the inequities that otherwise would result if a
plaintiff could not have discovered the cause of action within
the normal time frame.
Despite the numerous extensions of the discovery rule,
New York has refused to apply the discovery rule to cases of
childhood sexual abuse.24 The statute of limitations in sexual
abuse cases, therefore, begins to run on the last day of the
victim's sexual abuse. New York modifies the harshness of the
limitations period only when the victim is insane or a minor
when the sexual abuse occurs.' The accommodation however,
is quite limited; the infancy toll gives the victim three years
after reaching the age of majority to file suit." The statute of
limitations thus permits an adult survivor of childhood sexual
abuse to institute a civil claim against her abuser only until
she is twenty-one years old. Additionally, the insanity toll
applies only if the victim suffers from "an overall inability to
function in society.' The Second Circuit has held that vic-
tims of sexual abuse who suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, a debilitating psychological syndrome frequently
diagnosed in survivors of sexual abuse, are not insane within
the meaning of the toll.' Further, to benefit from either the
behalf of a principal, the time within which an action to recover damages for
breach of warranty of authority... shall be computed from the time the person
injured discovered the facts constituting lack of authority.").
" For a discussion on New York County Supreme Court's refusal to apply the
discovery rule to cases brought by victim's of childhood sexual abuce, see Richard
F. Hans Jr., The Survey of New York Practice, 66 ST. JOHN'8 L. REV. 223, 235-42
(1992-93).
21 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & I. 208 ("If a person entitled to commence an action is
under a disability because of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action
accrues . .. the time within which the action must be commenced shall be extend-
ed to three years after the disability ceases.... The time within which the action
must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after
the cause of action accrues.").
2 Id.
" McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 78 A.D.2d 849, 432 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d
Dep't 1980) (holding that plaintiff's personal injury action was time.barred because
during the period of supposed insanity he attended college, had a part-time job
and managed his affairs sufficiently), affd, 55 N.Y.2d 543, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 450
N.Y.S.2d 457 (1982).
2' Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a 32-year-old who
sought to recover for personal injuries resulting from sexual abuse inflicted by her
father when she was 12 years old could not benefit from the insanity toll because
although she suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, her debilitation was
not within Civil Practice Law's definition of insanity). Scc infra note 58 and ac-
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infancy or insanity toll, a plaintiff must commence litigation no
later than ten years after the cause of action accrues.29
The doctrine of equitable estoppel also does not furnish a
viable means for adult survivors of sexual abuse to toll the
statute of limitations."0 Under this doctrine, the victim must
show that "some unconscionable conduct on the defendant's
part, other than the alleged abuse itself, prevent[ed] the timely
filing of the cause of action."31 Since it is the nature of the
injuries that prevents a victim from timely filing suit in sexual
abuse cases, this exception to New York's statute of limitations
does not aid the majority of adult survivors of childhood sexual
abuse.
This Note argues that New York should apply the discov-
ery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse. Part I discusses
the prevalence and psychological impact of childhood sexual
abuse and the debate on the validity of repressed memories.
Part II examines the legal obstacles that bar adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse from bringing civil claims. This Part
considers the discovery rule as a means of tolling the statute of
limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases to permit the vic-
tim a day in court. Part III then investigates the New York
courts' refusal to follow the example of other states that apply
the discovery rule in cases of childhood sexual abuse. This
section also analyzes cases in which New York courts have rea-
soned that the legislature should adopt the discovery rule.
Next, Part III examines a proposed bill first introduced by the
New York State Senate in 1991, and reintroduced in 1993 and
1995, that would apply the discovery rule to cases of childhood
companying text (discussing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
2' N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 208. For example, if a child were sexually abused
until he or she was seven years old or younger, the victim would not be able to
file a civil suit against the abuser. Although the infancy toll would allow the vic-
tim to sue until he or she turns 21, the 10 year cap imposed upon § 208 would
prevent this group of victims from being able to benefit from this provision.
3O N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 17-103(4)(b) ('This section . . . does not affect the power
of the court to find that by reason of conduct of the party to be charged it is
inequitable to permit him to interpose the defense of the statute of limitation.");
see also Doe v. Roe, 192 A.D.2d 1089, 1090 596 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (4th Dep't
1993) (holding that defendant was not equitably estopped from asserting the stat-
ute of limitations defense in an action for sexual abuse because plaintiff failed to
establish that defendant's conduct caused her to "forego commencing timely action,
or that she was justified in relying on his conduct or misrepresentations").
' Donaldson, supra note 18, at 331.
(Vol. 61: 199
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sexual abuse.32 This Part questions New York's refusal to
adopt this rule in these cases, particularly in light of New
York's long history of applying the discovery rule in other ar-
eas of the law. Finally, this Note concludes that the discovery
rule is proper in childhood sexual abuse cases and, therefore,
that New York should adopt the proposed bill.
I. THE PREVALENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
A. The Prevalence and Nature of Childhood Sexual Abuse
The statistics on childhood sexual abuse are overwhelm-
ing. Experts indicate that as many as one in three women and
one in four men were sexually abused as children. Every
year, as many as 200,000 to 300,000 children are sexually
abused in the United States.' Researchers agree that, due to
underreporting, the incidence of childhood sexual abuse is
higher than these studies reveal.s
Studies of childhood sexual abuse reveal both the nature of
" N.Y.S. 5461, 213th Sess. (1991); N.Y.S. 1017, 214th Sess. (1993); N.YS.
3552, 215th Sess. (1995).
1 Leslie Mfiller, Sexual Abuse Survivors Find Strength to Spcah in Numbers,
USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1992, at 6D; sce also DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE, NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 89 (1984) (asserting that 'virtually all surveys
have shown sexual abuse to occur to well over one in ten of girls") [hereinafter
NEW THEORY]; DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
19 (1986) (studies of various populations have indicated that 36% to 627 of fe-
males and 3% to 31% of males have been sexually abused as children) [hereinafter
"SOURCEBOOK]. Widespread underreporting and various definitions of Eexual abuse
may dause the disparity in reporting and make it "impossible to accurately mea-
sure the prevalence of child sexual abuse." Rebecca L. Thomas, Note, Adult Survi-
vors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative
Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1991).
"James W. Harshaw II, Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitutionality
of Short Statutes of Limitations for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 753, 754 (1989).
"Julie S. Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression: Should it Toll the Statutory
Limitations Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1589, 1592
(1993); see also FINKELHOR ET AL., SOURCEBOOK, supra note 33, at 48 (four rea-
sons are suggested for underreporting. (1) experiences are blocked and not accessi-
ble to retrieval; (2) experiences are partly forgotten and only retrievable with prop-
er prompting, (3) experiences are in memory, but not defined according to terms
surveys use; and (4) experiences are in memory, but are not volunteered due to
embarrassment or other conscious withholding).
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the sexual abuse and the character of the injuries the abuse
produces. Both often prevent the victim from acknowledging
the abuse or making a connection between the abuse and the
resulting injuries. By their nature abusive sexual relationships
"depend on concealment, emotional blackmail, threats, and an
imbalance of power for their sustenance."' Underlying a
child's inability to disclose the abuse is "[t]he threat, the viola-
tion of essential boundaries, the absence of safety and a sense
of security, the secret shame, [and] the burden of maintaining
a facade of family cohesion."37 Additionally, the child's age,
naivet6 and lack of information severely diminish the child's
ability to resist sexual abuse.' In instances where the child
knows the abuser, the familiarity and trust the child feels
toward the abuser further undermine the child's power to
avoid the abuse.39 Finally, most children are too embarrassed
or frightened to tell their parents or other adults about the
abuse. This forced secrecy contributes to a sense of isolation
and stigma that often consumes the victim's childhood."
The burden of carrying the secret of the sexual abuse over-
whelms the child victim.4 The adult's natural domination and
coercion surpass the child's ability to tell anyone. The child
begins to believe she is responsible for the abuse42 and is con-
vinced that if she exposes the secret her family will fall apart:
for example, her mother will not believe her or may suffer from
a nervous breakdown; her parents will get divorced; or she will
be sent to a foster home.43 As a result, a child victim learns to
"internalize [her] injuries and.., enters adulthood with [her]
'z Thomas, supra note 33, at 1249 (footnote omitted).
31 JEROME KROLL, PTSD/BORDERLINES IN THERAPY: FINDING THE BALANCE 190
(1993).
FINKELHOR, NEW THEORY, supra note 33, at 61; see also DOUGLAS J.
BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 94 (1990) ("Aside from being naive, compli-
ant to an adult authority, and susceptible to bribes and promises of rewards ...
victims are often threatened with dire consequences to themselves, the abuser or
the rest of the family should they disclose the abuse.").
" FINKELHOR, NEW THEORY, supra note 33, at 61.
SFINKELHOR, NEW THEORY, supra note 33, at 93.
41 Camille W. Cook & Pamela K Millsaps, Redressing Wrongs of the
Blamelessly Ignorant Survivors of Incest, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1991).
4 As one adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse stated, "I know I was only
five years old, but I was an extremely intelligent five-year-old. I should have been
able to figure out a way to escape." BASS & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 35.
' Cook & Millsaps, supra note 41, at 8.
[Vol. 61: 199
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secret hidden not only from everyone around [her], but from
[herself] as well.""
B. The Psychological Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse
The impact of sexual abuse varies from case to case, de-
pending on the child's age and the frequency and the aggres-
sive or sadistic nature of the abuse. 5 The most consistently
reported effects are depression, 6 guilt and shame,"7 self-mu-
tilation and suicidal behavior,48 eating disorders and sleep
disturbances,49 drug or alcohol abuse,'0 inability to form inti-
mate relationships,"' tendencies toward promiscuity or prosti-
tution, 2 and a vulnerability toward re-victimization.'
The concept that individuals respond to anxiety-evoking
situations with various physical and psychological mechanisms
has been researched extensively and is largely accepted in the
medical field.'M In 1914, Walter Cannon described the body's
Cook & Mfillsaps, supra note 41, at 9-10.
"Carolyn B. Handler, Civil Claims of Adults Molested as Children: Maturation
of Harm and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 716
(1986-87). Additionally, a study conducted by Herman, Russell & Trocid in 1986
suggested that the severity of the psychological reactions to the sexual abuse de-
pend on the degree of violence, the duration of the abuse and the age difference
between the victim and the abuser. The study found that "violent, prolonged or
intrusive abuse or abuse by a primary caretaker represents stressors that are
beyond the adaptive capacities of all but the most exceptional children and that
will regularly produce a long-lasting traumatic syndrome 2m KROLL, supra note 37,
at 54.
41 Ann Al. Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult Survivors
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REV. 355, 359 (1991); see also Handler,
supra note 45, at 716; Silberg, supra note 35, at 1593.
4'7 Hagen, supra note 46, at 359; see also Silberg, supra note 35, at 1593.
'7 Hagen, supra note 46, at 359; Handler, supra note 45, at 716; Silberg, supra
note 35, at 1593. A study conducted by Carmen, Rilker & Mills in 1984 showed
that sexually abused individuals have a higher rate of suicide attempts and as-
saultive behavior than individuals with no history of sexual abuse. KROLL, supra
note 37, at 37.
KEOLL, supra note 37, at 52-53; Handler, supra note 45, at 716-17.
KROLL, supra note 37, at 52; Hagen, supra note 46, at 359; Handler, supra
note 45, at 717.
61 FINKELHOR, NEW THEORY, supra note 33, at 15; Hagen, supra note 46, at
360; Handler, supra note 45 at 717.
FINKELHOR, NEW THEORY, supra note 33, at 189; Hagen, supra note 46, at
360; Handler, supra note 45, at 717.
Handler, supra note 45, at 717.
CHESTER B. SCRIGNAR, POST-TRAUmATIC STRESS DISORDER, DIAGNOSIS, TREAT-
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innate reaction to stress as "fight or flight.""5 As one re-
searcher explains, "[w]hen a living organism [is] confronted
with a threat to its physical integrity," physiological reactions,
such as "increased heart rate and cardiac output, increased
respiration, dilation of the arteries," occur as a means of pre-
paring for flight or fight as an adaptation for survival.56 Con-
sistent with the phenomenon of "fight or flight," victims of
childhood sexual abuse develop various coping mechanisms to
survive the resulting trauma.57 Many victims suffer from
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), a clinically diag-
nosed mental disorder in which the victim represses psycholog-
ically unacceptable experiences until a later period when he or
she might be able to cope with them." A recent study found
that forty-three percent of sexually abused children develop
PTSD. 9 Other studies have reported the number of sexually
MENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES 8-10 (1984).
" Id. at 6.
Bruce Perry, Neurobiological Sequelae of Childhood Trauma: PTSD in
Children, in CATECHOLAMINE FUNCTION IN POSTTRAUrIATIC STRESS DISORDER:
EMERGING CONCEPTS 237-38 (M. Michele Murburg ed., 1994). Humans have devel-
oped various responses to enable them to survive danger. "When an individual is
exposed to real or perceived danger, a series of complex, interactive neurophysio-
logical reactions occur in the brain, the ANS [autonomic nervous system], the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortica (HPA) axis and the immune system." Id.
" Cook & Millsaps, supra note 41, at 10.
'9 Cook & Millsaps, supra note 41, at 10; Handler, supra note 45, at 717. The
American Psychological Association defines the three stages of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (hereinafter "PTSD") in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders: first, the victim begins to re-experience the abuse through flash.
backs and nightmares; second, the victim develops coping mechanisms to avoid
these images. At this stage the victim may experience dissociative episodes in
which repression may occur. Third, the victim displays the persistent symptoms
resulting from the abuse, such as self-hatred, sleep difficulties, anxiety, hyperactiv-
ity and interpersonal manipulativeness. AbiERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.89, at 248 (3d rev.
ed. 1987) [hereinafter "DSM-lI-R]; KROLL, supra note 37, at 188-89. PTSD was
originally associated with war veterans but has recently been observed in a high
percentage of rape victims, sexual abuse victims, survivors of natural disasters and
witnesses to violence. Perry, supra note 56, at 234. For a discussion on classifying
sexual abuse survivors with PTSI) with a distinct diagnostic category of "Post-
Incest Syndrome," see Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for
Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100
YALE L.J. 2189, 2192-95 (1991).
" The study examined 98 children admitted to a psychiatric inpatient unit for
short-term psychiatric care and based its PTSD diagnoses on information obtained
from clinical interviews and observation of the children's behavior and emotions.
Balkozar S. Adam et al., PTSD in Physically and Sexually Abused Psychiatrically
[Vol. 61: 19D
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abused children with PTSD as ranging from 20.7% to 66.%."e
The Center for the Study of Childhood Trauma has found that
in almost all cases, victims of childhood sexual abuse suffering
from PTSD "do not understand their symptoms as being relat-
ed to their... trauma, and often... cognitive recall of the
trauma is not present."61
Victims of childhood sexual abuse may develop additional
coping mechanisms, such as repression, blocking, compartmen-
talization or denial of the memories of the abuse, and, in some
instances, multiple personality disorder.' The victim learns
to "shut off' the pain by dissociation or accommodation.' Dis-
sociation allows the child to separate herself from the abuse by
Hospitalized Children, 23 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEv. 3, 4-5 (1992).
' Deblinger and associates studied hospitalized children and found that 20.7%
of the sexually abused children satisfied the criteria for PTSD. Esther Deblinger et
al, Post-Traumatic Stress in Sexually Abused, Physically Abused, and Nonabused
Children, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 403-08, 405 (1989). McCleer and associates
studied 31 children who had been sexually abused and found that 48.4% met the
DSM-III-R criteria for PTSD. Susan V. McCleer et aL, Post.Traumatic Stress Disor-
der in Sexually Abused Children, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENTr PSYcnI-
ATRY 650, 652 (1988). Craine and associates studied 105 state hospital patients
and found that 66.0% of the sexually abused patients met the DSM.IT.R criteria
for PTSD. KROLL, supra note 37, at 39.
61 Perry, supra note 56, at 236.
Cook & Millsaps, supra note 41, at 3. Dr. Gannon lists six defense strategies
that sexually abused children use to protect themselves from "the overwhelming
reality of the abuse." These strategies are denial, repression, turning against the
self, identification with the abuser, sublimation and compulsive rituals. J. PATRICK
GANNON, SOUL SURVIVORS 73 (1989). Repression is
the pushing down out of conscious awareness the memories, reflections,
and thoughts that are too overwhelmingly negative for the conscious
mind to handle.... Repression is responsible for the lack of memories
that many adult survivors [have] .. .The repression of old memories
will gradually lift when [the victim] feel[s] psychologically safe enough to
face them and the feelings connected to them.
Id. at 74. Denial is Ir]efusing to accept the existence of a thought, feeling, or
behavior.., the child ... can certainly deny that [the abuse] affects them, or
they can minimize how bad it might have been." Denial and repression together
make the events of sexual abuse "seemingly disappear behind a curtain of fog." Id.
at 73.
1 Dissociation is defined as a "mental process that separates the mind and
body, resulting in a disconnection between physical sensation and conscious experi-
ence. This usually occurs during intensely painful, stimulating or terrifying epi-
sodes of abuse." GANNON, supra note 62, at 74. One author defines accommodation
as a five-step syndrome: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommo-
dation, (4) delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction. For a
more detailed summary of the stages of accommodation, see Hagen, supra note 46,
at 361 n.46.
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altering her state of consciousness "as if looking on from a
distance at the child suffering the abuse."" Another conse-
quence of internalizing the traumatic emotions experienced
during sexual abuse is the psychological repression of all mem-
ories of the abuse." One study of PTSD describes this phe-
nomenon as follows:
Given the immaturity of most of the victims at the time of the
abuse, the traumatic nature of the abuse, the disturbed environmen-
tal matrix in which abuse usually occurs, and the layers of succes-
sive life experiences further colored by being filtered through the
consciousness of an already traumatized child, it is not surprising
that distortions, in the form of amnesias, partial and merged memo-
ries, and misperceptions of the significance of events, occur.6"
The childhood need for secrecy, as well as the various
coping mechanisms utilized to survive the abuse are the forces
underlying the adult survivor's failure to act timely in pursu-
ing civil legal remedies within the statutory period. The means
victims use to survive sexual abuse as a child are the same
means that prevent the adult survivor of sexual abuse from
confronting the abuse, dealing with it effectively, and begin-
ning finally to lead a healthy, psychologically sound life.67
C. The Validity of Repressed Memories
The validity of repressed memories has spurred a heated
debate within the fields of medicine, psychology and law. The
American Psychological Association's 1993 annual convention
centered its discussion on the validity of recovered memories of
childhood sexual abuse.6 Psychologists, psychiatrists and oth-
er mental health experts are split in opinion as to whether "the
sudden surge in recovered memories stems from better thera-
" Lamm, supra note 58, at 2194. When a child, helpless against the abuser
and the sexual abuse, has to endure the frightening and intimidating events, she
must psychologically "alter the perception and significance of the reality...
through depersonalization and dissociation" in order to survive. KROLL, supra note
37, at 189.
Hagen, supra note 46, at 362.
KROLL, supra note 37, at 32.
See Lamm, supra note 58, at 2193.
Shari Roan, In the Mind's Eye?: Battle Rages over Whether Repressed Memo-
ries Are a Key to Long-Forgotten Evils or a Pandora's Box of False Accusations,
L.A. TBIES, Aug. 25, 1993, at El.
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peutic techniques or a horrible abuse of therapeutic power."e
On one side of the debate are those who believe that mem-
ories are unreliable sources of information. Elizabeth Loftus, a
psychologist and expert on memory, reports that memory is
"inherently sketchy, reconstructive, and unlocalized." r The
human mind is not capable of retrieving memories intact;
memories are tainted with "personal vicissitudes." Loftus
charges that the techniques many clinicians use, such as sug-
gestive questioning and truth serum, can "create false memo-
ries in [the] vulnerable minds" of individuals who are seeking
psychological help.72 Motivated by the public hysteria about
sexual abuse, some mental health professionals, lawyers and
members of the media have exacerbated the problem of false
claims7 3
Conversely, many professionals believe in the validity of
recovered memories. Sigmund Freud first developed the theory
of repressed memories in the 1890s.74 Freud concluded that
"emotions have the power to block memory"  and that "re-
" Glenn Kessler, Repressed Memories: A Legal-Pzychological Tangle, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 28, 1993, at 7.
" Frederick Crews, The Revenge of the Repressed, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov.
17, 1994, at 54, 55.
7 Sidney Callahan, Memory Can Play Tricks, COMMONWEAU Dec. 17, 1993, at
6; see also Crews, supra note 70 at 55. Frederick Crews argues:
The very idea of repression and its unraveling is an embryonic romance
about a hidden mystery, an arduous journey, and a gratifyingly neat
denouement that can ascribe our otherwise drab shortcomings and pains
to deep necessity. When that romance is fleshed out by a gifted storytell-
er who also bears impressive credentials as an expert on the mind, most
in our culture will be disinclined to put up intellectual resistance.
Id-
"Elizabeth F. Loftus, Untested Claims Damage the Constitution, A.B.A. J,
Sept. 1994, at 43; see also ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KEIHAmi, THE MYTH
OF REPRESSED IEMORY 20-30 (1994). The authors criticize the book The Courage
to Heal by Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, claiming that "The Incest Survivors' Af-
tereffects Checklist" on the first page of the book encourages readers to compare
"their own experience with the questions intended to reveal abuse." Women alleg-
edly begin searching for memories of the sexual abuse and their "[tiherapists in.
sisted that their current pain was so severe that only repressed memories of trau-
matic abuse could explain it." Id. at 22-23. The women, wanting "so desperately to
get better... glive themselves up to therapy, surrendering their will, their rea-
son, their controL" Id. at 230.
' KROLL, supra note 37, at 34.
7 LENORE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES: TRUE STORIES OF TRAUMATIC MEMO-
RIES, LOST AND FOUND 6 (1994).
7f LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 72, at 49.
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pressed memories influence behavior, thinking, and emotions,
and produce mental symptoms.' 6 Most clinicians accept
Freud's theory of repression." Lenore Terr, a psychiatrist and
expert on memory, criticized Loftus's experiments on memory,
stating: 'What comes from the memory lab does not apply well
to the perceptions, storage, and retrieval of such things as
childhood murders, rapes, or kidnappings. Trauma sets up new
rules for memory." 8 Judie Alpert, professor of applied psy-
chology at New York University, asserts "[t]here is absolutely
no question that some people have repressed some memories of
early abuse that are just too painful to remember .... In their
20s and 30s some event triggers early memories, and slowly
they return.'" 9
The debate regarding the validity of repressed memories
should not prevent the discovery rule from bringing relief to
those adult survivors of sexual abuse who have meritorious
claims. The argument that no adult survivor of childhood sexu-
al abuse should have access to redress because of the potential
for false claims is misguided. The justice system is capable of
handling false claims; it does so every day. Credibility is the
special province of the fact-finder. If the possibility of false
claims were a basis for restricting access to court, virtually all
civil claims would never be heard. Because opponents of the
doctrine of repressed memory focus most of their objections on
inadequate therapeutic techniques, the American Psychological
Association should set up guidelines regarding techniques used
in therapy and "therapists [must] acquaint themselves with
what is actually known about memory.""0 Rather than foreclo-
sing all civil suits against abusers by adult survivors, safe-
guards against therapeutic abuses are needed. Additionally,
higher standards should be adopted for expert testimony, and
therapists' claims that they did not implant the memories of
sexual abuse should be strictly examined."1
7" TERR, supra note 74, at 6. Freud argued that childhood sexual abuse ac-
counts for repression. Id.
1 TERR, supra note 74, at 6.
78 Crews, supra note 70, at 55.
' Leon Jaroff, Lies of the Mind, TIME, Nov. 29, 1993, at 55.
o Frederick Crews, The Revenge of the Repressed: Part II, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 1, 1994, at 52 (Mark Pendergrast, author of Victims of Memory, offers various
recommendations "to address the real problem child [sexual] abuse").
"S Id. For example, California requires the attorney for the plaintiff in civil
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II. LEGAL OBSTACLES AND THE DISCOVERY RULE
The traditional statute of limitations bars most adult sur-
vivors of childhood sexual abuse from bringing civil claims.
Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a
cause of action first accrues, which is usually the date of the
injury.5 2 Because the unique psychological reactions stemming
from childhood sexual abuse prevent adult survivors from
acknowledging and understanding their injuries, victims often
are unable to bring their cases to court within the time-frame
prescribed by the statute of limitations.' The exceptional na-
ture of the injuries of child sexual abuse requires a flexible
application of the statute of limitations.
The harshness of traditional statutes of limitations has led
many courts and legislatures to adopt the discovery rule. This
rule allows an adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse to toll
the statute of limitations until he or she knows, or, through
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the
injury and its cause.' The U.S. Supreme Court condoned the
use of the discovery rule in Urie v. Thompson,' a negligence
case where the defendant had exposed an employee to silicosis
disease. The Court stated: 'We do not think the humane legis-
lative plan intended such consequences [barring the employee
from recovery because he did not discover the disease yet] to
attach to blameless ignorance.... [Clonsequently the afflicted
actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse to
execute a certificate of merit in which the attorney and a licensed mental health
practitioner set forth various facts supporting the claim. The attorney must con-
clude, after reviewing the facts of the case and consulting with at least one li-
censed mental health practitioner, that there is 'reasonable and meritorious cause
for filing the action." CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.1(e) (West Supp. 1995). The men-
tal health practitioner must not have treated the plaintiff and must conclude that
there is a "reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to
childhood sexual abuse. Id. Additionally, the defendant may not be served until
the court 'has reviewed the certificates of merit" and has found, in camera, that
there is "reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action." Id. Finally.
a certificate of corroborative fact, in which the attorney must "set forth in clear
and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact" is required.
Id. Violating this section may be "grounds for discipline against the attorney." Id.
Hagen, supra note 46, at 364.
Lamm supra note 58, at 2189.
84RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 899 cmt. e (1979).
8 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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employee can be held to be 'injured' only when the accumulat-
ed effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves."86
Although state application of the discovery rule has varied
widely, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
extended the discovery rule to cases of childhood sexual
abuse.8 7 In states that have applied the discovery rule to
childhood sexual abuse, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the victim has discovered the cause and fact
of the injury.88
To date, a majority of states recognize the inequities of
Id. at 170.
87 See ALASKA STAT. § .09.10.140(b) (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130
(Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-103.7(1) (Supp. 1994) & 1380-108 (1987 & Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/13.202.2
(1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-523(a) (Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp.
1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260 § 4C (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 541.073(2) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216(1)(b) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215 (1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 61B-1 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1.30 (Michie
Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §
12.117 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
26-10-25 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 522(a) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2.49(6) (Mitchie 1992 & Supp.
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1994). In addition to legisla-
tion, a number of state courts have adopted a similar stance in their case law.
See Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994) (holding that where a plaintiff
has alleged the total repression of recollection of childhood sexual abuse, her claim
does not accrue until the date that she recovered the memory to the extent that
she knew, or reasonably should have known of some injury and its cause); Meiers-
Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the three-year
period of limitations, applicable to a student's claim for damages resulting from a
teacher's sexual abuse, would be tolled if student could demonstrate that she had
psychologically repressed the memory of facts upon which the claim was predicat-
ed); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994) (holding that the discovery
rule tolled a 50 year-old daughter's claim of sexual abuse against her parents
despite the lack of corroborating evidence of the sexual abuse); Osland v. Osland,
442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989) (holding that the discovery rule extended the limita-
tions period in which a daughter could bring an action against her father based
on sexual abuse); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the
discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations where a victim of childhood
sexual abuse represses the memory of that abuse); L.C. v. AX.D., No. 05-92-
02867-CV, 1994 WL 59968 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994) (holding that the applica-
tion of the discovery rule is justified where the plaintiff presents objective evidence
of having been sexually abused during minority and thereafter continuously sup-
pressed the memory of the abuse as a result of the wrongful act).
' Hagen, supra note 46, at 365.
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applying the traditional statute of limitations to cases of child-
hood sexual abuse and in response apply the discovery rule to
such cases. Courts have not applied the discovery rule uniform-
ly- some only do so if there is verifiable evidence that the sexu-
al abuse actually occurred; 9 some require that the victim ac-
tually repress all memories of the abuse;" and some allow use
of the discovery rule whether the victim blocked the memories
of the abuse or simply did not understand the nexus between
the sexual abuse and the injuries incurred by it."
Only Michigan and Texas require independent corroborating evidence of the
alleged sexual abuse before an adult survivor can toll the statute of limitations.
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Brich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
three-year period of limitations, applicable to a student's claim for damages result-
ing from a teacher's sexual abuse, would be tolled if student could demonstrate
that she had psychologically repressed the memory of the facts upon which the
claim was predicated); L.C. v. AM.D., No. 05-92-02867-CV, 1994 WIL 59968 (Tex.
Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994) (holding that the application of the discovery rule is justi-
fied where the plaintiff presents objective evidence of having been sexually abused
during minority and therefore, continuously suppressed the memory of the abuse
as a result of the wrongful act). See also infra notes 102-12 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the development of the discovery rule in Nevada.
" Arkansas, Ohio and Utah require the victim to repress all memories of the
sexual abuse to toll the statute of limitations. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16.56-130
(Michie Supp. 1993) ("any civil action based on sexual abuce which occurred when
the injured person was a minor, but is not discovered until the injured parson
reaches the age of majority, shall be brought within three (3) years from the time
of discovery of the sexual abuse by the injured party."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-
25.1 (Supp. 1992) ("A person shall file a civil action for intentional or negligent
sexual abuse suffered as a child ... within four years after discovery of the exu-
al abuse"). Ohio adopted this stance in case law. Ault v. Jas-o, 637 N.E.2d 870
(Ohio 1994) (holding that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limita-
tions where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses the memory of the
abuse). The District of Columbia does not specifically limit the scope of the dis-
covery rule to cases of total repression, yet adopted the rule in this context. See
Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994) (holding that where a plaintiff has
alleged the total repression of recollection of childhood sexua abuce, her claim
does not accrue until the date she recovered the memory to the extent that she
knew, or reasonably should have known of some injury and its cause. See also
infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of
the discovery rule in Illinois and California.
" Most states that apply the discovery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse
permit the tolling of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff "disovers" the
connection between the sexual abuse and the psychological harm it caused. Sce
ALASKA STAT. §.09.10.140(b) (1990); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-103.7(1) (Supp. 1994) & 13-80-108 (1937 & Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1994); ILL REV. STAT. cl. 735 pars.
5/13-202.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523(a) (Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 752-C
(West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 260 § 4C (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
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A. Corroborating Evidence of the Occurrence of Abuse
Only Michigan and Texas require some sort of evidence
proving that the abuse actually occurred before allowing adult
survivors of childhood sexual abuse to use the discovery rule to
toll the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals of Michi-
gan held that in order to toll the statute of limitations for
sexual abuse, the plaintiff must not only demonstrate that she
has repressed all memories of the abuse, but also bring forth
corroborating evidence that the abuse occurred. 2 The court
relied upon the rules set forth in California93 and Washing-
ton94 which have since been overturned by subsequent state
legislation. 5
One of the first courts to address the extension of the
discovery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse was the
Washington Supreme Court in Tyson v. Tyson. 6 The court
held that it was improper to apply the discovery rule in cases
where an adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse recalled
events that were repressed from her consciousness if no means
STAT. ANN. § 541.073(2) (West Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.046(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216(I)(b) (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 61B.
1 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-25 (1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(a) (Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2.49(6) (Mitchie 1992 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1994). New Hampshire and North Dakota
adopted the "nexus" rule in case law. McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H.
1994) (holding that the discovery rule tolled a 50 year-old daughter's claim of
sexual abuse against her parents despite the lack of corroborating evidence of the
sexual abuse); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989) (holding that the
discovery rule extended the limitations period in which a daughter could bring an
action against her father based on sexual abuse). See also infra notes 131-38 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the development of the discovery rule in
Wisconsin.
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
g See supra notes 121-29 for a discussion of the development of the discovery
rule in California and 96-102 for a discussion of the development of the discovery
rule in Washington.
96 727 P.2d 226 (1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.16.340 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
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of independently verifying her allegations existed." In Tyson,
the victim was sexually abused from the age of three until the
age of eleven. She was so overwhelmed by the abuse that she
repressed its memory. When she entered therapy at age twen-
ty-six to address the emotional turmoil she had been experi-
encing, she became aware of the sexual abuse she had endured
and the psychological toll it had taken on her mental health."
The court held that application of the discovery rule to cases of
childhood sexual abuse would be appropriate only if the plain-
tiff presented evidence that substantially corroborated the
events alleged. A lack of empirical evidence would make it too
difficult for the court to determine the truth of the allega-
tions." Therefore, absent objective evidence of sexual abuse,
the discovery rule would not apply."0
In 1988, however, the Washington State Legislature over-
rode the court's decision and amended the statute of limita-
tions specifically to allow cases of childhood sexual abuse to
benefit from the discovery rule without requiring independent
evidence that the sexual abuse occurred.01 In stating "[it is
still the legislature's intention that Tyson... be reversed," the
Washington Legislature found that victims of childhood sexual
abuse "may repress the memory of the abuse or be unable to
connect the abuse to any injury until after the statute of limi-
tations has run.""°
Like Washington, Nevada too required corroborating evi-
dence of sexual abuse to toll the statute of limitations. In
Petersen v. Bruen,0 3 the Nevada Supreme Court held that
' 727 P.2d at 229-30.
I& at 227.
" Id. at 229-30.
100 Id See infra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissant-
ing opinion.
"I WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340. The statute allows actions based on
childhood sexual abuse to be commenced "[w]ithin three years of the time the
victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition
was caused by said act; or [w]ithin three years of the time the victim discovered
that the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought
102 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (Historical and Statutory Notes, citing
1991 Wash. Laws, ch. 212).
3 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990) (superseded by statute, NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215
(1991), which allows civil actions based on child sexual abuse to be commenced
within 10 years after the plaintiff 'discovers or reasonably should have discovered
that his injury was caused by the sexual abuse").
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"no existing statute of limitations applies to bar the action of
an adult survivor of [childhood sexual abuse] when it is shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has in fact
been sexually abused during minority by the named defen-
dant." °4 In Petersen, the victim was sexually abused from the
age of seven until the age of fifteen. The Big Brothers program
had assigned the abuser to be the victim's "big brother."' °
The abuser not only "exploited [a] relationship of trust" by
sexually molesting his assigned "little brother," but also "me-
morialized his depravity by taking photographs of [the victim]
before, during and after [his] sexual trysts with his victim."10
At age nineteen, when the victim began psychotherapy for
help with psychological and emotional problems, he began to
understand the causal connection between the sexual acts his
abuser imposed upon him and his emotional scars. Until thera-
py, the victim had repressed the eight years of sexual
abuse."7 After these memories resurfaced, the victim brought
a civil action against his abuser and filed criminal charges.
The abuser was convicted of sexual assault, attempted sexual
assault, lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, use of
a minor in producing pornography and possession of child por-
nography.' Despite the abuser's criminal conviction, the dis-
trict court dismissed the victim's civil action, which sought
damages for personal injuries, on the ground that it was time-
barred. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision
with a very narrow holding that demanded "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that the victim has in fact been abused.0 9 The
court stated, "[aibsent such evidence [in this case, photo-
graphs], a cause of action based upon allegations of CSA will
be subject to the regular two-year period of limitations.""0
The Nevada court's decision is of little use to the majority
*o' Petersen, 792 P.2d at 24-25.
Id. at 19. Big Brothers/Big Sisters, Inc. of New York City declares that "A
Big Brother/Big Sister is a special friend whose influence on a child's development
can be powerful. In the relationship, the adult serves to guide and lend a helping
hand to a child in need of a positive role model." BIG BROTHERS/BIG SISTERS, INC.
OF NEW YORK CITY, ONE FAMILY: INFORMATION FOR VOLUNTEERS.
"' Petersen, 792 P.2d at 19.
107 Id.
108 Id.
"09 Id. at 25.
no Id.
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of adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Most survivors do
not have photographs that demonstrate, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the abuse has occurred. The Supreme Court
of Nevada acknowledged that "proof of discovery in these types
of cases must depend in large measure on an inexact science
dealing with the psyche, [and] an anticipated conflict of expert
opinion will add a further dimension and obstacle to the
victim's attempt to reach first base."' Yet in issuing such a
narrow holding, the court further precluded adult survivors of
sexual abuse from ever reaching "first base." As with Wash-
ington, Nevada's legislature recognized the inequities of requir-
ing verifiable evidence and enacted legislation overturning the
requirement."
B. When the Victim Represses All Memories of the Abuse
Currently, Arkansas, Ohio and Utah allow adult survivors
of childhood sexual abuse to toll the statute of limitations only
if the victim repressed all memories of the abuse. The land-
mark repressed memory case is Johnson v. Johnson,"3 in
which the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois held that the discovery rule was applicable only to adult
survivors of childhood sexual abuse who have no conscious
memory of the acts of abuse." In Johnson, the victim's fa-
ther sexually abused her from the time she was three years old
until she was approximately thirteen years old." She was
diagnosed with Multiple Personality Disorder when she sought
the help of a therapist at age thirty-two. Until she entered
therapy she could not remember the sexual abuse."' The
court distinguished between cases in which the plaintiff knew
- Id at 24.
n2 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215 (1991).
' 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N). nL 1988), summ judg. granted, 766 F. Supp. 662
(N.D. ]]L 1991), superseded by revised statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/13-
202.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994) ('An action for damages for personal injury based on
childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person
abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that
the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the
childhood sexual abuse.").
u Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1369.
""Id, at 1363.
U Id. at 1366 (quoting the affidavit of the victim's therapist).
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that the abuse occurred but was not aware that the psycholog-
ical injuries were caused by the sexual abuse, and cases in
which the plaintiff repressed all memories of the sexual
abuse." The court held that the discovery rule was applica-
ble to the latter,"' reasoning that limiting the scope of the
discovery rule to such cases "will give the substantive law
room to develop."" 9 As in Washington, the legislature dis-
agreed with the court. In 1991, the Illinois legislature amended
its Code of Civil Procedure to provide adult survivors of child-
hood sexual abuse the benefit of the discovery rule in both
types of cases. 20
The California Court of Appeals also has held that the
discovery rule can be applied only in cases where a victim
repressed all memories of sexual abuse. 2' In Mary D. v. John
D., a father sexually abused his daughter from infancy until
she was approximately five years old. The victim's father re-
peatedly told her to not tell anyone. This secrecy and duress,
as well as the dependency by the victim on the abuser, caused
the victim to dissociate the acts of abuse, to deny her memories
and finally to repress them." When the victim was twenty-
three years old, she began to experience flashbacks while par-
ticipating in group therapy sessions "of being manually pene-
trated and masturbated by her father when she was an infant
and when she was about two or three years old."" She im-
mediately filed a civil suit against her father.
Building on its earlier precedent, the California court
limited the use of the discovery rule to cases where the victim
represses the memory of the abuse.'24 The court discussed
DeRose v. Carswell," where it had refused to apply the dis-
covery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse when the victim
was aware of the abuse at the time it occurred, but was unable
to causally connect the abuse with the psychological effects it
117 Id. at 1367.
n Id. at 1730.
n9 Id. at 1730.
-o See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/13-202.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
" Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989).
122 Id. at 634.
m Id. at 635.
124 Id. at 638.
'2' 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987).
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created. 26 The Mary D. court reasoned that it would be un-
fair to hold a victim of childhood sexual abuse who had re-
pressed memories of the acts of abuse to the statute of limita-
tions. The discovery rule would continue to not apply to a vic-
tim who was aware of the acts of the abuse but was not aware
of the connection between those acts and her psychological
injuries.'
California has since enacted legislation that rejects the
holding of DeRose by allowing the application of the discovery
rule to cases in which a victim represses all memories of the
sexual abuse and in cases in which the victim is unaware of
the connection between the sexual abuse and the resulting
psychological injuries.' The California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, amended in 1991, now allows adult survivors of child-
hood sexual abuse to commence a civil action "within three
years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occur-
ring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual
abuse."' 9
C. When the Victim Is Unaware of the Nexus Between the
Sexual Abuse and the Harm.
Most states that apply the discovery rule to cases of child-
hood sexual abuse have allowed its application in cases where
the victim was aware of the childhood assaults within the
statutory period of limitations, but was unaware of the connec-
tion between those acts and her psychological injuries. These
states recognize the unique nature of childhood sexual abuse
and its consequential harms, which, unlike traditional tort
injuries, do not occur simultaneously.'0 For example, in
," Id. at 372.
Mary D., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1993).
129 Id.
"' Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substanc-
es Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 972-974 (1988). The author lists two factors
that distinguish toxic tort litigation from the "snapshot" tort litigation in which
the harm and the plaintiffs injury occur simultaneously., a lengthy latency period
of the injuries and an uncertainty regarding the causal relationship between the
harm and the injury. Both are present in cases of childhood cexual abuse; thus,
these cases also are fundamentally different from the ordinary "saapshot" tort.
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Hammer v. Hammer,3' the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held
as a matter of law that a cause of action for sexual abuse does
not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of
the injury.132
In Hammer, the victim was sexually abused by her father
from the age of five through the age of fifteen. The father sexu-
ally abused his daughter an average of three times a week and
continually told her that she was to blame for its occur-
rence.133 The sexual abuse led to "psychological distress, in-
cluding great shame, embarrassment, guilt, self-blame, denial,
depression, and dissociation from her experiences."" The
victim's psychological counselor explained the victim's lack of
awareness about the injurious nature of the sexual abuse:
(1) it was of such a long duration and frequency that it had been
perceived by her as natural behavior; (2) [her abuser] had imposed
isolation and secrecy on her; (3) the abuse had a depersonalizing ef-
fects which had made her think of herself as an object to be used
rather than as a person with rights; (4) she had been told by her
father that the conduct was normal and his right, and (5) the abuse
by an authority figure on whom she was dependent had made her
distrustful of other authority figures who might have helped her."'
The court stressed that the policy reasons behind the stat-
ute of limitations are not persuasive in sexual abuse cases
because of the unique nature of its harm and therefore held
that the discovery rule applies to cases of childhood sexual
abuse."'
States vary in their application of the discovery rule to
cases of childhood sexual abuse. While some states are restric-
tive, requiring verifiable evidence before adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse can use the discovery rule, most states
are quite flexible, allowing adult survivors of childhood sexual
abuse to toll the statute of limitations until they either discov-
er that the abuse occurred, or they appreciate the nexus be-
" Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
112 Id. at 25.
133 Id. at 24.
134 Id.
36 Id. at 25.
"6 Id. at 27; see infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policies underlying statutes of limitations.
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tween the abuse and their psychological injuries." To date,
the majority of states have applied some form of the discovery
rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse. New York falls within
the minority of states that have denied adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse access to the courts in filing civil
claims against their abusers."'
III. NEW YORKS RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY RULE
Traditionally, New York has been hostile to the discovery
rule. 9 New York courts often have adhered stubbornly to
the "strict accrual" rule in which the statute of limitations
begins to run when the cause of action accrues, even though
the plaintiff may be unaware of the cause of action.' The
New York Court of Appeals consistently refuses to recognize
the discovery rule, except under circumstances where the legis-
lature has expressly provided for its application.' Beginning
in 1981, with the adoption of the discovery rule for cases in
which Vietnam veterans were injured as a result of exposure to
Agent Orange, the New York legislature finally recognized the
discovery rule for causes of action in which the victim was
"blamelessly ignorant" of his or her injury and its cause.'
New York remains reluctant, however, to apply the discovery
rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse.
, See supra notes 89-91.
"' See infra notes 143-58.
"' See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d 46, 56, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 723
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992) (the court recognized the judiciar's deference to
the legislature regarding telling the statute of limitations pending actual discovery
of the injury, but stated that [p]erhaps the time is ripe for legislative adoption of
a new discovery of the injury rule with respect to injury caused in rexual abuse
cases in the State of New York").
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & P. 203(a).
Hans, supra note 24, at 237-38.
1 Ch. 266 § 1 [1981] N.Y. LAWS 466.
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A. New York Courts' Refusal to Apply the Discovery Rule to
Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases
Bassile v. Covenant House" is a recent case that illus-
trates New York courts' animosity towards application of the
discovery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse. In Bassile,
the New York County Supreme Court refused to apply the
discovery rule to a claim brought by an adult who was sexually
abused during childhood. The victim was a resident of Cove-
nant House, a not-for-profit corporation that provided housing
and counselling to troubled youth "who, for a variety of rea-
sons, ended up alone and friendless on the harsh streets of
[New York] City.""' The alleged abuser, Father Frank Ritter,
was a Roman Catholic priest and the President of Covenant
House. The victim had sought counselling and advice from Fa-
ther Ritter, but instead had received "truly horrifying exploita-
tion."'45 Father Ritter allegedly had engaged in sexual con-
tact with the victim, causing the victim to suffer extreme emo-
tional and psychological damage. Although the court recog-
nized that the "special nature of sexual abuse and the psycho-
logical processes that it causes" make sexual abuse a perfect
candidate for the discovery rule, it stated that the Court of Ap-
peals has consistently "made it plain that it regards departures
from [the strict accrual] rule in particular categories of wrong
to be a subject for resolution by the Legislature."4 '
Likewise, in Schmidt v. Bishop,147 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that the statute of
limitations precluded a victim of sexual abuse from instituting
a civil claim against her abuser because "there is no authority
for the adoption of [the discovery] rule in childhood sexual
abuse cases in New York."'4 The victim's parents had
brought her to a pastor for spiritual guidance. The abuser then
initiated sexual contact with the victim and told her that God
143 152 Misc. 2d 88, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991).
14 Id. at 89, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
14 Id. at 90, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
148 Id. at 91, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
147 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
"' Id. at 329.
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approved of their special relationship."' Because of the
victim's age and dependence on the abuser, and because of the
abuser's religious position, the victim believed nothing was
wrong -with the abuser's conduct. The sexual abuse continued
from the time the victim was twelve years old until she was
twenty-eight, at which time she entered psychotherapy and
finally "began to understand that the contact with [the abuser]
was wrong, that he sexually abused [her,] and that [she] suf-
fered severe damage as a result of that abuse." " While rec-
ognizing that victims of childhood sexual abuse often do not
realize that they have been abused or understand the extent of
their injuries until years later, the court still "decline[d] to
invent a delayed discovery doctrine for this case." '51
Finally, the Nassau County Supreme Court also refused to
extend the application of the discovery rule to cases of child-
hood sexual abuse in Burpee v. Burpee 2 In Burpee, a father
sexually abused his daughter from the age of eight to eleven.
Because of her age and her relationship with her abuser, the
victim did not inform anyone of the abuse. As she later testi-
fied, "When this activity began, I was scared and confused.
Being a child, I was ignorant as to how to protect myself Due
to my father's horrible conduct, I suppressed these events." "
When the victim was twenty-six years old, she sought the help
of a therapist to aid her in dealing with various psychological
problems that, unbeknownst to her at the time, stemmed from
the sexual abuse to which she was subjected as a child.'
During a session in which her father was present, he admitted
that the sexual abuse had occurred. Finally understanding the
basis of her psychological pain, the victim brought an action
for personal injuries against her abuser."
The court barred the victim's claim, reasoning that al-
though sexually abusing children "call[s] for the severest con-
I Id. at 324.
1o Id. at 324; see supra note 135 and accompanying text for reasons why a
victim of childhood sexual abuse may not understand the nexus between the sexu-
al abuse and her psychological injuries.
16 Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 329.
16 152 Misc. 2d 466, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1991).
Id. at 467, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
Id. at 468, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
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demnation by all right-thinking persons of compassion," the
court "is nevertheless required to determine this matter in
accordance with the law of the State of New York as contained
in its statutes and judicial precedents."156 The court was con-
cerned that its decision reflected insensitivity to the plight of
childhood sexual abuse, but explained:
[that [a child sexual abuser] can so successfully avoid liability for
alleged misconduct is abhorrent not only to the victim but to those
who strongly feel that law should never honor what they see as form
over what they feel is substance. This feeling is understood by the
Court, but law, not feelings, must govern us-or there will be no law
at all."'
Although expressing empathy for adult survivors of child-
hood sexual abuse, judges in New York have continued to cling
to the traditional statute of limitations and to defer their pow-
er to change the law to the legislature. New York, so often
legislatively progressive, is uncharacteristically lagging in this
area of the law. Unless the legislature enacts legislation that
allows the application of the discovery rule to cases of child-
hood sexual abuse, courts will surely follow the pattern pur-
sued in toxic torts cases. That is, the courts will continue to
adhere to the "strict accrual" rule until the legislature enacts
superseding law.5 ' It therefore is incumbent upon the legis-
lature to further amend the Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR") and apply the discovery rule to cases of childhood
sexual abuse.
B. The Proposed Bill
The New York State Senate recently introduced a bill that
would amend New York's CPLR to provide a discovery rule for
victims of childhood sexual abuse."9 The proposed amend-
ment provides that a victim of sexual abuse may bring a claim
"' Id.
' Burpee, 152 Misc. 2d at 471, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 362.1 Before the enactment of Civil Practice Law and Rules section 214, New York
courts refused to adopt the discovery rule for latent diseases. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 214-c commentary (McKinney 1990); Steven L. White, Toward a Time.of.
Discovery Rule for the Statute of Limitations in Latent Injury Cases in New York
State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 113 (1984-85).
169 N.Y.S. 5461, 213th Sess. (1991).
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"within five years from the time of discovery by the injured
party of both the injury and the causal relationship between
the injury and the childhood sexual abuse or exploitation,
whichever period expires later."60 The bill has been referred
to the codes committee but to date no action has been taken.
Although the bill was re-introduced in 1993,16 the committee
still has not acted upon it. State Senator David A. Paterson,
who first introduced the bill, re-introduced the bill yet again in
1995.162
The rationale underlying the adoption of the discovery rule
in these cases is that victims should not be foreclosed from
judicial remedies before they know of their injury and can
discover its cause."6s This view outweighs any policy that the
statute of limitations may serve."' The discovery rule at-
tempts to solve the dilemma of maintaining a cause of action
when the wrongful act and injury do not occur simultaneously
or when the victim is incapable of discovering the injury within
the statutory period."
This same rationale underlies the New York legislature's
extension of the discovery rule to various tort causes of ac-
tion. 66 The enactment of New York's CPLR section 214-b,
which applied the discovery rule to cases where Vietnam veter-
ans were injured as a result of exposure to Agent Orange, was
the beginning of a series of extensions of New York's discovery
rule. The legislative findings affixed to the amendment of New
York's CPLR stated: "An exception to the general period of
limitation rule is required when the pathological effect of an
injury occurs without perceptible trauma, and the victim is
blamelessly ignorant of the cause of the injury."" Based up-
160 Id.
"I N.Y.S. 1017, 214th Sess. (1993).
1'2 N.Y.S. 3522, 215th Sess. (1995).
16 Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (Nev. 1990).
"'See infra notes 173-88 and accompanying text for policy arguments against
applying the discovery rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse.
1"I Handler, supra note 48, at 712.
166 See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 682 N.Y. Laws (July 30,
1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Laws 3183 (wThis bill... repeals that archaic rule
[which commences the three-year time period for suit on the date that the injury
occurs] and replaces it with a fair and simple rule which permits a person to
discover his or her injury before the statutory time period for suit begins to run.").
'v Ch. 266 § 1 [1981] N.Y. LAWS 466 (emphasis added).
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on the same reasoning, New York further amended the CPLR
and applied the discovery rule to victims of toxic torts.16" Ad-
ditionally, the New York legislature has extended the discovery
rule to fraud,169  medical malpractice' ° and actions for
breach of warranty of agency."' The rationale underlying the
application of the discovery rule to these tort actions applies
equally to cases of childhood sexual abuse.
Similar to victims of toxic torts, fraud, medical malpractice
and breach of warranty of agency, victims of childhood sexual
abuse are "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause of action and the
connection between the abuse and their injuries. The "dormant
nature" of the injuries stemming from childhood sexual abuse
is identical to that "suffered by one who has inhaled a toxic
substance but has failed to manifest symptoms of a disease
until years after the exposure occurred."" 2
C. New York's Legislature Should Apply the Discovery Rule to
Cases of Childhood Sexual Abuse
Policy arguments that support the doctrine of statute of
limitations are outweighed by adult survivors' right of access
to New York courts. Scholars maintain that "[t]he fundamental
reason why a claim will lapse with time, a principle accepted
everywhere, is the wish to finalise matters once and for
all.""'3 Those who oppose the application of the discovery rule
to cases of childhood sexual abuse argue that there is a lack of
168 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 214-c.
"' N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 213(8) ("an action based upon fraud; the time with.
in which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the
plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with
reasonable diligence have discovered it"); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(7)
(applying the discovery rule to actions to annul a marriage based on fraud).
10 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214-a ("where the action [for medical, dental or
podiatric malpractice] is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body
of the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery").
"I N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. L. & R. 206(b) ("Where an injury results from the repre-
sentation by a person that he is an agent with authority to execute a contract in
behalf of a principal, the time within which an action to recover damages for
breach of warranty of authority ...shall be computed from the time the person
injured discovered the facts constituting lack of authority.").
12 Hans, supra note 24, at 241.
'" TIME-BARRED ACTIONS at xiii (Francesco Berlingieri ed., 1993).
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evidence due to the time lapse involved. Additionally, critics
argue that the function of the statute of limitations is to pre-
vent stale claims. Arguments against applying the discovery
rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse, however, are easily
overcome by the interests of those who are sexually abused as
children.
Opponents of applying the discovery rule to cases of child-
hood sexual abuse argue that often corroboration is impossible
and that physical evidence is non-existent because the abuse
occurred so long ago. 74 Opponents further suggest that the
unreliable nature of memories, coupled with the lack of evi-
dence due to the time lapse involved, make it difficult for ju-
ries to "weigh the credibility of victim and accused," because
they must "rely on revelations from psychotherapy.... [which]
may not be a reliable source of facts."
Yet studies have shown that repressed memories are often
trustworthy. Judith Herman, an associate clinical professor of
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, conducted a study in
which 79% of fifty-three women in group therapy were able to
obtain independent corroboration of their memories of child-
hood sexual abuse. 6 Additionally, studies of documented
cases of sexual abuse illustrate that memories of abuse com-
monly are confined within the child's subconscious. A study at
the University of New Hampshire's Family Violence Research
Laboratory found that of 200 children treated for sexual abuse,
one in three did not remember the incidents that were dom -
mented in their hospital records twenty years earlier.'
Evidentiary problems should never outweigh a victim's
opportunity to sue. As in any case, the fact- finder must weigh
the credibility of the parties. Also, "[blecause the statute [of
limitations] is automatically tolled until the child reaches the
age of majority, the evidence is already old when the statute
begins to run."7 8 Fundamental fairness requires that victims
174 Roan, supra note 68 at E6.
17' Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered Lives,
A.BA J., Nov. 1993, at 71.
'7' The women were able to verify with photographs, abuser'a confe3sions or
other evidence that the sexual abuse had, indeed, occurred. Laura A. Kiernan, Are
Repressed Memories Reliable?: Court Decision in Abuse Case Puts State in National
Debate, NEW HAMPSHIlE WKLY, Apr. 24, 1994, at 1.
177 Id.
178 Gary Hood, Note, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought
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have an opportunity to prove that sexual abuse occurred, and
that repression or an unawareness of the causal connection
between the abuse and the harm prevented the victim from
bringing suit within the conventional limitations period."9
The prevention of stale claims also has been thought to
preclude the discovery rule from applying to cases of childhood
sexual abuse.18 For example, the Montana Supreme Court
held that the discovery rule did not apply to a case in which an
adult was unaware of the causal relationship between her inju-
ries and the sexual abuse that had occurred when she was five
to eight years old."8' The court refused to apply the discovery
rule based on its assertion that the victim knew of the abuse
when the abuse occurred. According to the court, the policy
underlying the statute of limitations-namely the prevention of
stale claims-outweighed the victim's lack of awareness as to
By Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 417, 436 (1994); see also Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 230-37 (Wash. 1986)
(dissenting opinion) (if the plaintiff brought suit within the statutory period, at
age 21, the evidence would have been 10 years old. Rather, she filed suit at age
26; therefore, the evidence was 15 years old. In holding the statute of limitations
barred plaintiffs suit, the majority relied on the policy argument that old evidence
is unreliable. The dissent observed, "even if 'objective, verifiable evidence' were an
overriding concern in this context, evidence which is now fifteen years old rather
than ten years old is not logically so much less 'verifiable' that it warrants the
harsh result of foreclosing a potentially meritorious claim." Id. at 232 (dissenting
opinion)).
17 Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1118-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(dissenting opinion) (the majority opinion held that the statute of limitations was
not tolled until an adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse "rediscovered" re-
pressed memories of the abuse), superseded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (7) (West
Supp. 1994), ("An action founded on alleged [sexual] abuse ... may be com-
menced . . . within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of
both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse.").
Defense attorneys have advocated the practice of hearings prior to trial where de-
bate on the validity of repressed memories can be heard. But many in the legal
field maintain that judging the weight of the evidence should be left to a jury."
Kiernan, supra note 176.
180 "One of the most ingrained policies stems from the belief that with the pas-
sage of time, the defendant's right to repose supplants the plaintiffs right to a
remedy." Handler, supra note 48, at 720. But see Hammer v. Hammer, 418
N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) ("The injustice of barring meritorious claims
before the claimant kaows of the injury outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent
actions." (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 335 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Wis. 1983)).
... E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988) (actions based on childhood sexu-
al abuse must be commenced no later than "3 years after the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of child-
hood sexual abuse"), superseded by statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1991).
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the causal connection between her injuries and the abuse."
A few years later, the Montana legislature superseded this
decision by statute." Montana now allows a victim of
childhood sexual abuse to commence a civil action within three
years from the time she realizes the causal connection between
the injuries and the abuse.
The statute of limitations encourages plaintiffs to file time-
ly suits and is "designed to give an injured party a reasonable
length of time in which to assert a claim.... The presumption
is that one who has a legitimate claim will be diligent in en-
forcing it."" Although it is in the interest of society to dis-
suade plaintiffs from unreasonable delay in asserting their
rights, "[ideally,... a statute of limitations achieves a balance
between the right to a remedy and the value of repose."m
Even if traditionally the presumption that legitimate plaintiffs
will file timely suits is proper, in cases of childhood sexual
abuse that presumption is inappropriate. In these circum-
stances it is unfair to conclude that a plaintiff has "slept on his
or her rights" if he or she was not aware of the harm or injury
within the traditional limitations period."
In contrast to these weakened statute of limitations policy
concerns, powerful policy arguments support tolling the statute
of limitations so that victims of childhood sexual abuse can
bring civil suits against their abusers. If victims of childhood
sexual abuse can recover monetary damages for the harm the
abuse caused, many survivors can afford to continue psycholog-
' E.W., 754 P.2d at 820.
I'MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1991).
Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limitations and the Discoery Rule in Latent
Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PIT'. L. REV. 501, 512-13 (1932).
"s Id. at 514.
'8 I&; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
30, at 166 & n.13 (5th ed. 1984).
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you ae conceived, or be
divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted. ... For
substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a
sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a cause of action before the cause exists, Le., before a judicial
remedy is available to the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)
(dissenting opinion). The policy question thus becomes: "i a plaintiff cannot discov-
er an injury or its cause, even when exercising diligence, should the law neverthe-
less bar an action in the interest of preserving repose and promoting efficiencyT'.
Glimcher, supra note 184, at 514.
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ical counseling. Counseling aids survivors in learning to deal
effectively with the psychological problems that resulted from
the abuse. By remembering the abuse, and instituting legal
action, the victim finally may be able to accept not only that
the sexual abuse did occur, but also that the memories may
never be fully complete. Additionally, these suits will increase
the public's awareness of the long-term debilitating effects of
childhood sexual abuse, and also may serve as a deterrent."8 7
Shielding from liability a defendant accused of sexually abus-
ing children does not outweigh the victim's right to seek re-
dress for the abuser's "intentional actions [that] have caused
the victim a lifetime of repercussions."1"
CONCLUSION
The number of sexually abused children is astonishing and
dismaying.'89 Instead of living the carefree lives children
ought to be able to enjoy, sexually abused children manifest
severe physical, psychological and emotional problems. Sexual-
ly abused children are tormented by feelings of fear and help-
lessness. The overt and implied threats from the abuser bur-
den the children with guilt and shame. In response, they devel-
op various psychological problems, such as low self-esteem, de-
pression, eating disorders and sleep disturbances. Additionally,
many sexually abused children develop mechanisms to block
the pain of the abuse, such as dissociation, repression and
denial. Some sexually abused children repress all memories of
the sexual abuse. Other such children grow up never realizing
that their suffering is a result of the sexual abuse.
Already, thirty states have recognized the inequities that
result from applying traditional statutes of limitations to cases
of childhood sexual abuse. It is simply outrageous to deny
adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse a day in court when
the abuse itself causes the latent injuries that prevent them
from filing suit within the limitations period. New York, how-
ever, has allowed the sexual abusers' right to repose to out-
187 Hagen, supra note 46, at 374.
Hood, supra note 178 at 437.
18 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion on the prev-
alence of childhood sexual abuse.
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weigh the sexually abused victims' right to redress. New York
selectively has recognized the idea that victims should not be
foreclosed from judicial remedies before they are aware of their
injury and its cause. Thus, New York's refusal to enact the
discovery rule for adult survivors of sexual abuse is bewilder-
ing given its application of the discovery rule to medical mal-
practice, injury caused by Agent Orange, and latent diseases.
The proposed legislation would remove the barrier created
by the traditional statute of limitations, thus allowing victims
of childhood sexual abuse to institute civil claims against their
abusers. The New York legislature must seize the opportunity
to enact the discovery rule for victims of childhood sexual
abuse. It now is incumbent upon the legislature to enact the
proposed amendment into law to prevent people who sexually
abuse children from using the statute of limitations as a shield
from liability. New York must prevent the inequities resulting
from the traditional statute of limitations in cases of childhood
sexual abuse and recognize the manifest injustice of barring
the claims of victims of childhood sexual abuse before they
realize such a claim even exists.
Rosemarie Ferrante
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